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RIGHTS WITHOUT A BASE: THE TROUBLING AMBIGUITY AT 
THE HEART OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
STEPHEN A. SIMON* 
ABSTRACT 
It is not only the outcomes of rights controversies that matter, but also the 
kinds of reasons that count as legitimate in constitutional debate. A question of 
pivotal importance is whether rights are rooted in uniquely American sources, 
such as the will of the people, or in universal sources reaching beyond the 
unique context of American politics, such as the requirements of liberty and 
human dignity. The question is even more fundamental than the debate over 
originalism, because the views of the Framers might be considered 
authoritative either because they embodied popular will or because they 
reflected inherent truths about freedom. Since many scholars consider 
universal arguments illegitimate, simply identifying their use in constitutional 
interpretation often is treated as a conversation-ending accusation. But 
universal arguments continue to figure in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
regardless, which makes studying their role essential. By examining not just 
when but how the Justices have appealed to considerations transcending the 
American context, this Article demonstrates a troubling ambiguity at the heart 
of constitutional law. It matters a great deal whether rights are peculiarly 
American or universal in character; this Article shows how the Court 
undermines constitutional protections by fostering uncertainty over the basis of 
cherished rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is not only the outcomes of rights controversies that matter, but also the 
kinds of reasons that count as legitimate in constitutional debate.1 A question 
of pivotal importance is whether rights are rooted in uniquely American 
sources, such as the will of the people, or in universal sources reaching beyond 
the unique context of American politics, such as the requirements of liberty 
and human dignity. The question is even more fundamental than the debate 
over originalism, because the views of the Framers might be considered 
authoritative either because they embody popular will or because they reflect 
inherent truths about freedom. Since many scholars consider universal 
arguments illegitimate,2 simply identifying their use in constitutional 
interpretation may be treated as a conversation-ending accusation. But 
universal arguments continue to figure in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
regardless,3 which makes studying their role essential. By examining not just 
when but how the Justices have appealed to considerations transcending the 
American context, this Article demonstrates a troubling ambiguity at the heart 
of constitutional law. 
As used here, “particular arguments” (or “non-universal arguments”) refers 
to justifications that treat norms of decision as being generated by the choices 
of specific people, as reflected, for example, in the Framers’ intentions, the 
binding force of enactments, traditional American practices, and the 
preferences and attitudes of the American people. By contrast, “universal 
arguments” reach beyond the context of any specific political community. In 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, universal arguments principally have taken 
the form of appeals to intrinsically valid principles that follow necessarily from 
the meaning of certain concepts or highly general standards of evaluation, such 
 
 1. RONALD C. DEN OTTER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN AGE OF MORAL PLURALISM 2–3 
(2009) (contending that judicial observers “must care more about the method than about the 
outcome” in studying the reasons that courts offer to justify decisions). 
 2. See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, UCLA L. 
REV. 639, 703 (2005) (referring to judicial reliance on “[m]odern varieties of the natural law 
tradition” as “discredited”); see also STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION & THE PRIDE OF 
REASON 93 (1998) (noting that “[i]n judicial discourse ‘natural law’ has been used more as an 
epithet to assail decisions a judge dislikes than as a constructive or favored position, and the 
political controversy surrounding the charge that Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had 
endorsed a natural law philosophy suggests that this attitude of hostility has not substantially 
softened.”). 
 3. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (where the majority reasoned that 
liberty “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311, 321 (2002) (where the Court, 
in holding that the execution of mentally retarded persons violated the Eighth Amendment, 
asserted its prerogative to conduct an “independent evaluation” of whether a challenged practice 
comported with the requirements of “the dignity of man”). 
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as the requirements of freedom.4 If the concept of freedom has meaning and 
implications that necessarily follow, then the resulting requirements do not 
depend on the expressed preferences of any particular people. Even if the 
Court’s immediate concern (and jurisdiction) is limited to the implications of 
the cited standards within the United States, the justificatory argument is 
universal in character. While the reference to universality easily evokes terms 
like “natural law,” “natural rights,” or “natural justice,” the Justices more 
commonly have used other formulations, with prominent examples including: 
limitations on government flowing from “the nature of society and of 
government”;5 rights following from the “very idea of a government, 
republican in form”;6 requirements “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty”;7 “principles which are the basis of all free government”;8 or standards 
for “determin[ing] whether a challenged punishment comports with human 
dignity.”9 
Judicial reliance on arguments that are unique to the American context are 
pervasive and taken for granted in American law,10 which is not surprising 
given that the judges are institutional actors empowered by, and operating 
within, a particular community governed by its enacted laws. The question is 
whether judges ever may rely on universal arguments in discerning the 
meaning of constitutional rights. One major approach on the Court 
(championed today, for example, by Justice Antonin Scalia) has rejected 
universal reasoning entirely.11 A competing approach (advocated by Justices 
Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and others) has defended the use of 
 
 4. E.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657–58 (1829). 
 5. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810). 
 6. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). 
 7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 8. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 291 (1901) (White, J., concurring). 
 9. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 10. Reliance on statutory enactments and common law traditions is so common and widely 
accepted that it does not occasion controversy, and judges do not feel the need to cite sources in 
support of the proposition that they are appropriate reference points in judicial decision-making. 
The controversial question is not whether judges may rely on sources reflecting American 
preferences, such as legislative acts and longstanding practices, but, rather, whether judges must 
rely exclusively on such sources. For example, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 
3028–30 (2010), Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion for a five-member majority relied heavily on 
history and tradition in holding that the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms applied against 
the states. In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer did not challenge the appropriateness of Justice 
Alito’s sources, but, rather, argued that they were not in themselves decisive. Id. at 3120 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that it was also appropriate, for example, to consider a 
right’s importance according to its substantive content. Id. at 3123 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
McDonald is discussed further below. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
rights interpretations should be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RIGHTS WITHOUT A BASE 105 
universal arguments, but, as I show below, often has combined them with non-
universal arguments in a confusing way that calls into question whether the 
universal arguments really are doing any work.12 Regardless of one’s views on 
the validity of universal arguments, this core ambiguity in the Court’s 
jurisprudence is troubling for a legal system that depends on litigants engaging 
the arguments driving changes in constitutional law. 
The significance of universal arguments frequently is overlooked, because 
they are associated with “natural law,”13 a term which carries baggage that is 
unwelcome in constitutional discourse, including religious premises14 and the 
prioritization of property rights.15 But universal arguments need not carry with 
them the ideas associated with traditional conceptions of natural law. To avoid 
the distorting effects of false associations, this Article zeroes in on the crux of 
what makes universal arguments distinctive—the appeal to reasons that do not 
depend on the unique context of American politics. The remainder of the 
Article advances two main arguments:  Part I argues that ambiguity in the 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the basis of rights is troubling in light of the 
Court’s leading role in signaling to litigants and other legal actors the kinds of 
reasons that count in constitutional interpretation; and Part II and the 
 
 12. For example, as discussed below, see infra Part II, in Lawrence, the majority reasoned 
from the implications of liberty, while also citing statistics reflecting public attitudes, without 
clarifying the interrelationship, if any, between these two fundamentally distinctive kinds of 
sources. 539 U.S. at 570–71. 
 13. E.g., JUSTIN BUCKLEY DYER, NATURAL LAW AND THE ANTISLAVERY 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 2 (2012); HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS & 
ANCHORING TRUTHS: THE TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAW 43 (2010); CHARLES GROVE 
HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in 
the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 172 (1992). 
 14. Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 180 (2008) (“Most, 
but not all, natural law theorists are theists. They believe that the moral order, like every other 
order in human experience, is what it is because God creates and sustains it as such.”); see 
generally CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(1963). 
 15. The Founding generation believed that property rights were rooted in natural law, 
MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 111 (1996), and the Constitution reflected an emphasis on 
property rights. (For example, Article I, Section 10 prohibited governmental interference with 
contracts. In addition, the Fifth Amendment prohibited seizure of private property without 
compensation, and deprivation of property without due process.) The Supreme Court paid 
attention principally to property until well into the twentieth century, often applying natural-law 
reasoning in protecting property rights. HAINES, supra note 13, at 160–65. In the late 1930s, 
however, the Court abandoned this line of jurisprudence and generally demoted property in its 
hierarchy of rights. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). Natural law had been associated with the 
prioritization of property, and judicial reliance on natural law to strike down legislative acts has 
been seen as discredited since the Court shifted away from property and towards the protection of 
other categories of rights. 
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Conclusion show how this core ambiguity has been exacerbated in recent 
decades by the Justices’ increasing tendency to mix universal and non-
universal arguments in confusing ways. 
I.  THE CORE AMBIGUITY IN THE COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE 
The Justices have relied on universal arguments since the Court’s first 
constitutional decisions.16 Opposition to the use of universal arguments also 
dates back to the Court’s earliest period.17 Justices arguing for exclusive 
reliance on particular arguments have treated constitutional rights as reflections 
of popular will, with interpretation guided principally by constitutional text, 
the Framers’ intentions, and traditional understandings.18 Opponents of 
universal arguments have contended that judges lack the authority to ground 
decisions in universal reasoning (or “natural law,” as they more commonly 
refer to it), which is too vague and speculative to guide interpretation.19 In their 
view, purported reliance on universal arguments opens the door to the 
illegitimate imposition of the Justices’ own subjective will on the nation.20 In 
Calder v. Bull (1798), for example, Justice James Iredell, responding to 
another Justice’s appeal to the “general principles of law and reason,” 
denounced judicial reliance on principles of natural justice.21 Another 
prominent proponent of an exclusively particular approach, Justice Hugo 
Black, criticized the Court’s use of universal standards, such as “civilized 
decency,” and the “fundamental liberty and justice,” which he referred to 
 
 16. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 453, 455–56 (1793), for example, Justice James 
Wilson examined the controversy first by “principles of general jurisprudence,” and argued that 
states, like individuals, were subject to basic principles of right, justice, and equality, while 
Justice John Jay reasoned from the “obvious dictates of justice,” and argued that administering 
justice “without respect of persons” formed part of “the promise which every free Government 
makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and protection.” Id. at 472, 479. 
 17. In Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), for instance, where Justice John Jay reasoned 
from the rights “which every free Government makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and 
protection,” id. at 479, and Justice James Wilson relied on basic principles of right, justice, and 
equality, id. at 455-56, Justices John Blair (concurring) and James Iredell (dissenting) looked only 
to text, with Justice Blair saying the Constitution was “the only fountain from which I shall draw; 
the only authority to which I shall appeal.” Id. at 430, 450. 
 18. Justice Hugo Black, for example, stressed the importance of hewing to the Constitution’s 
commands, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (Black, J., concurring), rather than 
allowing judicial will to displace the decisions of legislatures. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 
46, 95 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 19. E.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). 
 20. E.g., Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 668–69 (1874) (Clifford, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that judicial reliance on extra constitutional limitations in the form of “natural justice” 
would “convert the government into a judicial despotism”). 
 21. Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring). 
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pejoratively as reliance on “natural law.”22 In a similar vein, Justice Scalia 
repeatedly has asserted that rights interpretations should be “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition[s].”23 Opponents of universal arguments 
most often have opposed evolutionary approaches to interpretation,24 which is 
not surprising given the emphasis on specifically American enactments, 
traditions, and practices. At times, however, most notably in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, they have allowed for shifts in rights 
interpretations, provided that those changes were discerned according to 
evolving popular sentiment as expressed through legislation.25 
Since many Justices have disapproved of universal arguments altogether, 
their criticism has focused on the wholesale unacceptability of such 
arguments.26 Unlike the criticism by advocates of an exclusively particular 
approach to interpretation, however, my objection is that the Justices who 
defend universal arguments too often have used them in a manner that 
undermines their distinctive contribution. If universal arguments serve a 
beneficial role, it is because they provide a basis for interpretation that does not 
reduce to political power. The Justices, however, often have combined 
universal and non-universal arguments in ways that call into doubt whether the 
former really are doing any work.27 That is, the Justices have employed 
universal arguments in ways that produce confusion regarding the basis of 
rights. 
Lawrence v. Texas (2003) serves as an illustrative example. In September 
1998, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner were arrested, held overnight, 
and charged with violating a Texas law that made it illegal for two persons of 
the same sex to engage in certain sexual acts.28 The police officer who made 
the arrest had entered Lawrence’s apartment to investigate a report of a 
domestic disturbance.29 The report turned out to be false, but the officer 
claimed to have observed the men engaging in sexual acts in violation of the 
 
 22. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69, 70, 91 n.18 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 23. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 24. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 629 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 
380–82 (1901) (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
 25. E.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (opposing an evolutionary approach, but arguing that if one were to be 
used, it should look exclusively to American practices). 
 26. In all of the cases discussed, the Justices opposing judicial reliance on natural rights 
arguments did not simply focus on the implications of natural rights arguments for the case at 
hand, but, rather, launched general attacks on what they considered the illegitimacy of such 
arguments. See supra notes 3–12 and 15–25. 
 27. See infra Parts I and II. 
 28. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63. 
 29. Id. 
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statute.30 The state proceedings resulted in a fine being imposed on Lawrence 
and Garner, and the Texas courts upheld the punishment against the 
defendants’ constitutional challenge.31 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion (joined by Justices Stephen 
Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens)32 held that 
the Texas law deprived Lawrence and Garner of their liberty in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: “No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”33 Justice 
Kennedy did not seek to show that his interpretation of liberty followed simply 
from the text or intentions of the Amendment’s framers, but, rather, maintained 
that the meaning of constitutional rights had to be understood as continuously 
evolving.34 He stated that the Constitution allows “persons in every generation 
[to] . . . invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom,”35 and 
described the Court’s decision as recognizing an “emerging awareness” of the 
rights at issue in the case.36 The opinion suggested more than one approach to 
discerning the evolving meaning of rights. On the one hand, following a line of 
jurisprudence associated most famously with Roe v. Wade (1973),37 Justice 
Kennedy seemed to be making a universal argument, resting the opinion on the 
implications of liberty. He asserted that liberty “presumes an autonomy of self 
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”38 This sphere of autonomy, Justice Kennedy found, included an 
individual’s choice of partner in an intimate relationship.39 More specifically, 
he wrote: “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct . . . the 
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The 
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to 
make this choice.”40 
The opinion, however, also cited laws, practices, and commentary in the 
United States and overseas. The justification for overturning Bowers v. 
 
 30. Id. at 563. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 562. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor also voted with the majority but wrote a 
concurring opinion arguing that she would have invalidated the Texas law as violative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, as the majority had reasoned. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 33. Id. at 578-79; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 34. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 578–79. 
 35. Id. at 579. 
 36. Id. at 572. 
 37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 38. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 39. Id. at 567. 
 40. Id. 
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Hardwick (1986),41 handed down only seventeen years earlier, included 
statistical information showing that between 1986 and 2003 the number of 
states with laws like those at issue in Bowers and Lawrence had dropped from 
twenty-five to thirteen.42 Even among the states that retained such laws, four 
applied them only to acts between persons of the same sex, and there was “a 
pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in 
private.”43 Texas itself had not prosecuted in situations where the intimate acts 
were private and consensual.44 Justice Kennedy noted that Bowers had been 
criticized by commentators and that courts in five states had not followed 
Bowers when interpreting the meaning of liberty under their own state 
constitutions.45 Additionally, the American Law Institute in its 1955 
promulgation of the Model Penal Code recommended against the adoption of 
legal prohibitions on “consensual sexual relations conducted in private,” and a 
number of states complied.46 Justice Kennedy also cited overseas sources, 
observing that the British Parliament in the late 1960s had repealed laws 
criminalizing homosexual conduct, and that the European Court of Human 
Rights in 1981 had invalidated Northern Ireland’s laws criminalizing 
homosexual acts.47 Other countries had “taken action consistent with an 
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, 
consensual conduct.”48 
Lawrence received a good deal of scholarly attention49 and renewed debate 
on questions in constitutional theory, including whether constitutional rights 
evolve,50 and the proper role, if any, of foreign law51 and traditional practices52 
 
 41. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 42. Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 573. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 576. 
 46. Id. at 572. 
 47. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73. 
 48. Id. at 576. 
 49. E.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 
115–23 (2006); Benjamin J. Roesch, Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection 
of Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 414–17 (2006); Ronald J, 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use, 
Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
923, 927 (2006). 
 50. E.g., Ronald Kahn, Originalism, the Living Constitution, and Supreme Court Decision 
Making in the Twenty-First Century: Explaining Lawrence v. Texas, 67 MD. L. REV. 25 (2007); 
Richard G. Wilkins & John Nielsen, The Question Raised by Lawrence: Marriage, the Supreme 
Court and a Written Constitution, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1393 (2007). 
 51. E.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law’s Limited Domain Confronts 
Morality’s Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1582 n.7 (2007); Steven G. 
Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s 
Practice of Relying On Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1398, 1412 (2006); William D. 
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in interpretation. While these questions are important in their own right, they 
are studied too often as discrete issues without adequate appreciation of their 
interrelation with the more fundamental, underlying question regarding the 
basis of rights. The problem with Justice Kennedy’s opinion was not that it 
included unacceptable types of citations, but that it failed to clarify what role 
the variety of sources cited were supposed to play in the analysis. Without 
more, statistics on legislative trends and citations of foreign judicial opinions 
do not provide a justification for an interpretive position; their relevance can be 
assessed only when we know how they are supposed to fit into a justificatory 
line of argument. Justice Kennedy’s opinion failed to establish a universal line 
of justification, because the swirl of unexplained citations called into question 
whether the universal arguments really were integral to the analysis after all. 
The opinion also failed to establish a particular line of justification, because it 
did not adequately explain how or why state or foreign practices were 
supposed to impact the content of constitutional rights.53 
Consider the citations of state practices; how did they fit into Justice 
Kennedy’s argument? Perhaps Justice Kennedy was advancing a particular line 
of argument, with trends in state practices demonstrating a shift in American 
attitudes. If this is what Justice Kennedy intended, however, then we would 
expect to see a greater marshaling of evidence regarding public attitudes at the 
time of Bowers and Lawrence, or an argument explaining why trends in state 
legislation were the most reliable indicator of public attitudes. On the other 
hand, Justice Kennedy might have been advancing a universal line of 
argument, with the increasing societal recognition of a right offered as 
evidence of its indispensability to liberty. Justice Kennedy, however, did not 
articulate that claim, which, in any event, would have been difficult to maintain 
given the degree of continued dissensus on the question.54 
With respect to Justice Kennedy’s foreign citations, we can envisage at 
least two ways in which they might support a universal line of analysis. First, 
foreign judicial opinions might offer persuasive arguments demonstrating why 
the right at stake in Lawrence followed necessarily from a commitment to 
liberty, but Justice Kennedy did not offer these arguments. Second, an 
 
Araiza, Foreign and International Law in Constitutional Gay Rights Litigation: What Claims, 
What Use, And Whose Law?, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455, 456 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi, 
Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign 
Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (2004). 
 52. E.g., Ronald Turner, Traditionalism, Majoritarian Morality, and the Homosexual 
Sodomy Issue: The Journey From Bowers to Lawrence, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2004); 
Krotoszynski, supra note 49, at 927, 1018. 
 53. Reliance on state and foreign practices, generally, is discussed at length below. See infra 
Part II.D. 
 54. By Justice Kennedy’s own account, for example, thirteen states still had laws like those 
at issue in Bowers and Lawrence. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
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overwhelming global consensus might be evidence of a right’s indispensability 
to cherished freedoms, but Justice Kennedy did not articulate this view either. 
Moreover, he did not show anything like a consensus on the issue before the 
Court. Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that the citations together reflected an 
“emerging awareness” of the right at stake simply pushed the question back 
one step,55 because we want to know how an increase in the recognition of a 
right supports the claim that the right is protected by the Constitution. 
Moreover, while gesturing towards both universal and particular arguments, 
Justice Kennedy failed to explain their relationship. Did one line of argument 
serve the other? Did each reinforce the other, or did they just happen to come 
out the same way? If the two lines of argument were independent of one 
another, which would prevail in the event that they cut in opposite directions? 
The opinion did not begin to address these questions. 
The sum effect of these deficiencies is an inability to discern the basis of 
decision, which is troubling in light of the Court’s preeminent role as expositor 
of constitutional rights. We cannot expect judicial opinions to have the 
precision of a philosophical paper, and we should not be surprised if they 
sidestep certain issues. The question of concern here, though, is not a nice 
detail in reasoning, a discrete doctrinal issue, or a matter of peripheral interest; 
it concerns what kinds of justifications underlie the interpretation of rights. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence was not an anomaly, but, rather, 
stands as an example of one of the two major approaches on the Court; it is an 
approach which allows for changes in constitutional meaning and approves of 
judicial appeals to universal standards, such as the requirements of liberty56 or 
human dignity,57 in discerning those changes. This interpretive school enjoys a 
long lineage, including late nineteenth-century due process cases58 and the 
second Justice John Marshall Harlan’s59 influential dissent60 in Poe v. Ullman 
(1961).61 Justice Harlan’s opinion in Poe drew on the privacy that was “basic 
to a free society” in arguing that the Court should have overturned 
 
 55. Id. at 572. 
 56. E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937). 
 57. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
 58. E.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530–31 (1884); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 
366, 387 (1898). 
 59. The first Justice John Marshall Harlan served on the Court from 1877 until 1911. His 
grandson, the second Justice John Marshall Harlan, served on the Court from 1955 until 1971. 
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supreme 
court.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2012). 
 60. The opinion had formative importance in the development of the right to privacy. See 
Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 85–87 (2003). 
 61. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Connecticut’s contraception ban.62 Justice Harlan knew that many opposed this 
kind of reasoning, because they believed that it allowed judges excessive 
discretion. After noting that the Justices were engaged in a “rational process” 
of “supplying . . . content” to the concept of liberty, he sought to head off a 
foreseeable line of objection in stating that this process “has not been one 
where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take 
them.”63 His attempt to defend this proposition included references to history, 
the Framers’ purposes, and public attitudes, and he suggested that 
constitutional interpretation entailed the following: 
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which [due process] 
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a 
living thing. A decision . . . which radically departs from it could not long 
survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be 
sound. No formula could serve as a substitute . . . for judgment and restraint.64 
The opinion, though, did not indicate how the Justices were supposed to 
identify the traditions worth preserving. Justice Harlan said that interpretation 
involved drawing out the meaning of broad concepts, and he pointed to a 
variety of factors, including traditions and public attitudes, but the opinion did 
not explain how these factors figured in interpretation. The opinion did not 
clarify whether evolving public attitudes directly brought changes in 
constitutional meaning or were only relevant because prudence demanded that 
the Justices not stray too far from them. It contained the same kind of 
confusion that continues to characterize the Justices’ use of universal 
arguments. Especially in recent decades, practitioners of the universal, 
evolutionary approach advocated by Justice Harlan have used universal 
arguments in a manner that is incomplete and hedged. It is incomplete because 
the Justices’ references to universal standards too often are cursory, failing to 
fill in the gaps leading from the citation of universal standards to the 
conclusions in individual cases. It is hedged because the opinions fail to clarify 
the relation between their universal and particular arguments, thus calling into 
question whether the former are doing any independent work. 
These difficulties in the Justices’ use of universal arguments are evident, 
for example, in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.65 In one 
prominent, recent decision, Atkins v. Virginia, a 5-4 majority suggested 
reliance on universal arguments in asserting its prerogative to conduct an 
“independent evaluation” of whether a challenged practice comported with the 
 
 62. Id. at 550–53. 
 63. Id. at 542. 
 64. Id. at 542–43. 
 65. The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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“the dignity of man.”66 Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court, however, also 
leaned heavily on recent shifts in public attitudes and state practices without 
making clear how these considerations related to the requirements of dignity.67 
Would the Court’s decision have come out the same way if the nation’s 
“evolving standards of decency”68 did not cut in the same direction as the 
Court’s own evaluation? If not, in what sense was the Court’s evaluation 
independent? The majority did not say. Similarly, Roper v. Simmons 
concentrated on trends in state and foreign practices without explaining their 
relation to the requirements of dignity, thus leaving unclear how the particular 
and universal lines of justification interacted.69 Though ambiguity regarding 
the basis of constitutional rights is not new, as discussed in the next Part, it has 
been exacerbated by an increasing tendency on the part of the Justices to rely 
on arguments appealing to popular attitudes without preserving an independent 
role for universal arguments. 
II.  DEVELOPMENTS EXACERBATING THE CONFUSION IN THE COURT’S 
JURISPRUDENCE 
While universal arguments are perhaps best known with respect to 
opinions regarding property rights in the early nineteenth century70 and again 
during the Lochner era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,71 
they have played key roles in many other areas of jurisprudence, including 
procedural due process, the question of whether the Constitution applies in 
U.S. territories, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As discussed 
below, however, in recent decades the Justices in each of these areas have 
produced confusion by incorporating a greater stress on non-universal 
considerations without adequately clarifying their relation with the universal 
standards that they continue to reference. 
 
 66. 536 U.S. 304, 311, 321 (2002) (disallowing the execution of mentally retarded persons). 
 67. Id. at 314–16; see infra notes 353–68. 
 68. Id. at 321. 
 69. 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005) (disallowing the execution of juveniles); see infra notes 
369–88. 
 70. E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810). 
 71. E.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). The term “Lochner era” refers to a 
period roughly between the late 1890s and the late 1930s when the Supreme Court used the right 
to pursue a lawful calling and the liberty of contract, drawn from the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, to strike down certain governmental regulations pertaining to business and 
economic matters. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE 
AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
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A. Procedural Due Process 
Although the first major decision on the meaning of due process,72 decided 
under the Fifth Amendment, held that historical pedigree was a sufficient 
condition for the constitutionality of a criminal procedure,73 the Court shortly 
afterwards established an approach to the procedural branch of its due process 
jurisprudence that relied on universal arguments in discerning the evolving 
meaning of due process protections. Soon after the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
enactment, litigants argued that it constrained state criminal procedures, either 
because Bill of Rights provisions applied or the Due Process Clause directly 
imposed limitations.74 In the first challenges brought under the Amendment, 
the Court suggested a move away from a purely historical approach by 
inquiring into whether procedures comported with essential requirements of 
due process.75 
The Court explicitly adopted a universal, evolutionary approach in 
Hurtado v. California, holding the grand jury requirement76 inapplicable in 
states despite its historical roots, because allowing development of new 
procedures was necessary to “progress or improvement.”77 In determining how 
the meaning of rights could change, Hurtado centered analysis on universal 
standards, appealing to the “rights in every free government beyond the control 
of the state”,78 and stating that any procedure that “preserves these principles 
of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.”79 Due process 
served as a “bulwark[ ] . . . against arbitrary legislation,” and guaranteed “not 
 
 72. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 311, 321 (2001) (describing 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. as the Supreme Court’s first analysis of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 73. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1855). 
 74. E.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 518–19 (1884) (where the defendant argued 
on appeal that his conviction on charges brought by a procedure other than by a grand jury 
violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 75. Kennard v. Louisiana, for example, upheld challenged procedures, because they satisfied 
indispensable elements of due process, such as “the right to be heard . . . both in the court in 
which the proceedings were originally instituted, and, upon . . . appeal.” 92 U.S. 480, 483 (1875). 
Two years later, the Court found that due process was fulfilled where the parties challenging a tax 
assessment had been provided a “fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of 
proceeding applicable to such a case,” noting that the parties received personal service of notice, 
an opportunity to object, and a full and fair hearing. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105–
06 (1877). 
 76. The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall be held to answer 
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 77. 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884). 
 78. Id. at 536–37 (quoting Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874)). 
 79. Id. at 537. 
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particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to 
life, liberty, and property.”80 Broad requirements followed from these universal 
standards: legislation had to be general and “not a special rule for a particular 
person or a particular case,” and a valid law “hears before it condemns, . . . 
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.”81 The omission 
of a grand jury indictment did not violate these requirements.82 
The Court applied and built on the Hurtado framework in the following 
decades.83 In applying this framework, the Justices during this period often 
cited predominant practices or popular beliefs (historical and contemporary) 
while making clear that these citations served supporting roles within an 
overarching analysis that was universal in character. In Twining v. New 
Jersey,84 for example, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege 
against self-incrimination85 did not apply against the states, notwithstanding its 
long history of observance, declining to accept that “the procedure of the first 
half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American 
jurisprudence like a straight-jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional 
amendment.”86 In his opinion for the Court, Justice William Moody stated that 
the central question was whether a right represented “a fundamental principle 
of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government and is 
the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government[.]”87 Justice Moody’s 
use of history in applying that universal standard was notable; longstanding 
observance was significant if based in a belief that the practice represented an 
“unchangeable principle of universal justice,”88 but not if it merely had been 
thought “just and useful.”89 Inclusion in the Bill of Rights was not decisive, 
because the question was whether the right enjoyed “a sanctity above and 
before constitutions themselves.”90 The opinion’s historical examination 
included: pre-Constitutional America; “the great instruments in which we are 
accustomed to look for the declaration of the fundamental rights”;91 and the 
 
 80. Id. at 532. 
 81. Id. at 535. 
 82. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538. 
 83. E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); West v. 
Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899). 
 84. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
 85. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 86. Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 101, 114. 
 87. Id. at 106 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)). 
 88. Id. at 113. 
 89. Id. at 107. 
 90. Id. at 113. 
 91. Twining, 211 U.S. at 107. 
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practices of individual states.92 Justice Moody also looked beyond American 
law, observing that the “wisdom of the [privilege] has never been universally 
assented to since the days of Bentham; many doubt it to-day . . . . It has no 
place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of 
the common law . . . .”93 Thus, the absence of uniformity in American and 
foreign practices counted as evidence against the privilege’s status as a 
fundamental right. The examination of practices reflected on the requirements 
that followed from universal standards, as Justice Moody concluded that the 
privilege had not been understood as embodying a fundamental principle that 
was indispensable to the protection of liberty.94 
The Court’s use of history within a universal framework also was 
illustrated by Powell v. Alabama (1932), in which the Court for the first time 
invalidated a state criminal procedure on Fourteenth Amendment grounds,95 
overturning rape convictions because the defendants were denied the right to 
counsel.96 The community was so racially hostile that the young black 
defendants had to be accompanied by military guard, and the colloquy between 
trial judge and appointed counsel revealed an appalling indifference regarding 
the adequacy of the defense.97 The Court found the right to counsel essential to 
a hearing because the “right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”98 Arbitrary denial of 
the opportunity to retain counsel violated due process, since even well-
educated defendants with a viable defense risked conviction without the 
benefit of representation.99 Due to the defendants’ youth and lack of education, 
and the severity of the charges, the Court concluded that the trial judge was 
required not only to permit the defendants to retain counsel but also to ensure 
the appointment of effective counsel if they could not afford it.100 In a capital 
case with uneducated defendants in dire need of assistance, the right to 
appointed counsel followed as “a logical corollary from the constitutional right 
to be heard by counsel.”101 Justice George Sutherland’s majority opinion used 
 
 92. Id. at 108–10. 
 93. Id. at 113. 
 94. Id. at 110. 
 95. William G. Ross, The Constitutional Significance of the Scottsboro Cases, 28 CUMB. L. 
REV. 591, 592 (1998). The rights the Court had declined to apply against the states included the 
right to a jury trial in a civil case, Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875), and the right to a 
twelve-member jury trial in a criminal case. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595 (1900). 
 96. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71, 73 (1932). 
 97. Id. at 53–58. 
 98. Id. at 68–69. 
 99. Id. at 69. 
 100. Id. at 73. 
 101. Powell, 287 U.S. at 72. 
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history as evidence of the right’s fundamental status.102 American law and 
practice always had afforded defendants the right to aid of counsel, and the 
federal government and every state required appointment of counsel for serious 
crimes: “A rule adopted with such unanimous accord reflects, if it does not 
establish, the inherent right to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like the 
present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to 
the fundamental nature of that right.”103 
Without viewing history as decisive, then, the Court during this period 
found a role for it within a universal framework. Lack of uniformity in 
historical and contemporary practice militated against a procedure’s inclusion 
in due process; that reasonable people could disagree suggested a procedure 
was not essential to fairness and justice.104 Thus, in Wolf v. Colorado (1949), 
the Court held that the exclusionary rule105 did not bind the states despite its 
applicability in the federal context.106 States were bound by the Fourth 
Amendment’s core principle ensuring “the security of one’s privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion by the police,” because it was “basic to a free society,” and 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”107 but this was not true of the 
exclusionary rule. Justice Felix Frankfurter’s majority opinion observed that 
prior to Weeks v. United States (1914),108 which applied the rule in the federal 
context, only one state of twenty-seven had adopted the rule, and at the time of 
Wolf a majority of the states (thirty-one of forty-eight) still rejected it.109 
International practices also failed to support the rule.110 The investigation of 
state and foreign practices demonstrated that reasonable people continued to 
disagree, which cut against finding that the rule had risen to the level of a 
 
 102. Id. at 60–65. 
 103. Id. at 73. 
 104. Within an examination of whether uniform observance supported a finding of a right’s 
fundamental status, even judicial opinions could count as evidence of the possibility for 
reasonable disagreement on the essential nature of a right. In Kepner v. United States, for 
example, the Court had held that the federal government violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause by instigating a second trial of the same case on its own motion. 195 U.S. 100, 
133–34 (1904). When the Court declined to apply the Kepner rule against the states in Palko, it 
pointed to a dissenting opinion in Kepner as evidence that “right-minded men could reasonably 
believe” that allowing retrial on the prosecution’s motion was not “repugnant to the conscience of 
mankind.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
 105. The exclusionary rule prohibits the prosecution from using evidence at trial that was 
obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 506 
(5th ed. 1979). 
 106. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
 107. Id. at 27. 
 108. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 109. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29. 
 110. Id. at 30. 
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fundamental right.111 The significant observation was not the trend towards 
adoption of the rule, but that substantial disagreement remained.112 
However, the Court in the early 1960s moved to a new approach, selective 
incorporation,113 which placed a greater emphasis on non-universal 
arguments.114 Selective incorporation did retain an overarching appeal to 
universal standards; in determining whether a Bill of Rights provision applied 
against states, the Justices still would inquire whether the right was 
“fundamental and essential to a fair trial,”115 or “essential for preventing 
miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all 
defendants.”116 Thus, when the Court in Mapp v. Ohio for the first time applied 
 
 111. Id. at 28–29. See also Betts v. Brady, where the Court inquired whether the right to 
counsel was “in all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of 
fairness,” and found guidance in the “common understanding of those who have lived under the 
Anglo-American system of law.” 316 U.S. 455, 464 (1942). As in Twining, the investigation of 
practices asked how widely the right had been considered essential to fairness. Justice Owen 
Roberts’s historical examination did not reveal a uniform view in favor of providing counsel to 
all indigent defendants. Betts, 316 U.S. at 465–66. Common law required allowance of 
representation but not appointment of counsel. Betts, 316 U.S. at 466. Some states, both in 1789 
and 1949, provided counsel by statute but did not secure the right constitutionally. Betts, 316 U.S. 
at 469–70. Dissensus on appointed counsel as a fundamental right supported a finding that it was 
not required by due process. Betts, 316 U.S. at 471. 
 112. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting in his 
discussion of Wolf that “the relevance of the disparity of views among the States . . . lies simply 
in the fact that the judgment involved is a debatable one.”). It did not follow, however, that 
common recognition of a right necessarily brought it within due process. Id. The rule prohibiting 
prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, for example, did not apply against the 
states despite its widespread observance. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54–58 (1947). 
Thus, Adamson did not turn on the prevalence of practices but on the nature of the right at stake 
and the application of universal standards to the circumstances of the case. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 
54–58. Justice Stanley Reed’s plurality opinion reasoned that California’s policy did not deprive 
the defendant of the right to be heard, because it did not provide for any presumptions as to facts 
or guilt based on the failure to testify; it simply allowed the jury to draw inferences from 
undisputed facts. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 58. It was fair for the prosecution to note that a defendant 
chose not to contradict inculpatory evidence. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 56. 
 113. The first decision in which a majority adopted selective incorporation was Mapp. 367 
U.S. 643. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2209 (2002). 
 114.  See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
 115. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465). 
 116. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968); see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 403 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). It also should be noted that the Court 
has retained an appeal to universal standards in procedural claims that appeal exclusively to the 
concept of due process itself without involving provisions in the Bill of Rights. This is a 
distinction that was, strictly speaking, irrelevant before the Court’s adoption of selective 
incorporation. In such “free-standing” due process claims, as before selective incorporation, the 
Court frames inquiry around overarching standards such as “avoidance of an unfair trial,” Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), or a “miscarriage of justice,” United States v. Bagley, 473 
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the exclusionary rule against the states, it linked the rule with principles 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.117 In overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 
which had declined to apply the rule against the states,118 Mapp did not reject 
that case’s reliance on universal standards but its manner of applying them.119 
Mapp found that the rule necessarily followed as an “essential part of the right 
to privacy.”120 Similarly, when the Court overturned Betts in Gideon it stated 
that the earlier decision had correctly asked whether the right of an indigent 
criminal defendant to appointed counsel was “fundamental and essential to a 
fair trial,” but had incorrectly answered that question in the negative.121 
Under selective incorporation, however, the Court “increasingly looked to 
the specific guarantees of the [Bill of Rights] to determine whether a state 
criminal trial was conducted with due process of law.”122 As applied, the new 
approach placed so much weight on inclusion in the Bill of Rights that it 
amounted to a heavy presumption in favor of incorporation. By 1969, the 
Court applied almost every Bill of Rights provision against the states.123 The 
very notion of listing which Bill of Rights provisions were incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contradicted the earlier 
framework. Under the previous approach, a right might be fundamental to a 
fair trial in one set of circumstances but not another; the unit of analysis was 
the fairness of a specific trial. By contrast, the unit of analysis under selective 
incorporation was a specific constitutional provision, not the entire 
 
U.S. 667, 675 (1985); see Israel, supra note 72, at 311 (quoting Murray’s Lessee where the Court 
first carefully analyzed the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause). 
 117. 367 U.S. 643, 655. 
 118. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
 119. 367 U.S. at 656. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (overturning Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 
455 (1942)); see also Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403 (“We hold today that the Sixth Amendment’s right 
of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made 
obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–
18 (framing issue as “whether the right of an accused to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, guaranteed in federal trials by the Sixth Amendment, is so fundamental 
and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 122. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 18); 
see also Duncan v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (“In resolving conflicting claims concerning 
the meaning of this spacious language [in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause], the 
Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance.”). 
 123. The only rights in the first eight Amendments that have not been fully incorporated are 
the Third Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers, the Fifth Amendment’s grand 
jury indictment requirement, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a unanimous jury verdict, the 
Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil cases, and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on excessive fines. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010). 
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Amendment,124 and the inquiry concerned whether the right as a rule was 
essential to fairness.125 
The impact of this shift was magnified by another feature of selective 
incorporation: once the Court incorporated a Bill of Rights provision, it 
automatically applied it against the states in all existing rulings interpreting 
that provision in the federal context. Mapp illustrated the implications of this 
unitary approach. In Wolf, the Court had held that the core principle of the 
Fourth Amendment fell within due process but that the states were not bound 
by decisions interpreting the Amendment in the federal context.126 Selective 
incorporation rejected this kind of differential application. Mapp noted that the 
Court did not allow differential application of other rights applied against the 
states via due process, such as free speech and press.127 Just like those other 
rights, the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy was also “basic to a free 
society” and, thus, called for protection at the state level to the same degree as 
at the federal level.128 Under selective incorporation, once a provision was 
incorporated, interpretations from the federal context came with it.129 The 
Court refused to apply a “watered-down” version of the Bill of Rights against 
the states because it “would be incongruous to have different standards 
determine the validity of a claim . . . depending on whether the claim was 
asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must [apply] . 
. . in either a federal or a state proceeding . . . .”130 
Together, these changes meant that the Court would not in each case have 
to engage in an essentially universal analysis by inquiring into the fundamental 
 
 124. Compare Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (considering the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel), 
with Pointer, 380 U.S. 400 (considering that same Amendment’s right to confront witnesses). 
 125. Benton, 395 U.S. at 795. 
 126. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
 127. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). 
 128. Id. (quoting Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27). Similarly, Gideon noted that a wide range of Bill of 
Rights protections had been held “equally protected against state invasion” due to their 
“fundamental nature.” 372 U.S. at 341. Examples included the First Amendment’s freedoms of 
speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for redress of grievances, the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition on seizure of private property without compensation, and the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 341–42; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (applying the privilege against self-incrimination on the same terms in the 
state and federal contexts, and noting that other Bill of Rights provisions, including the 
“guarantees of the First Amendment,” had also been “enforced against the States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against 
federal encroachment”). 
 129. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10–11. 
 130. See id. But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (creating an exception by ruling 
that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials but not in 
state criminal trials); contra McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.14 (2010) 
(finding that the Apodaca exception “was the result of an unusual division among the Justices, not 
an endorsement of the two-track approach to incorporation”). 
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fairness of a specific trial. Instead, once a specific Bill of Rights provision had 
been applied against the states, the Court could approach each case as an 
application of a textual provision that applied against the states via the Due 
Process Clause. By the late 1960s, selective incorporation entailed an 
additional modification to the earlier framework that further enhanced the new 
framework’s emphasis on non-universal arguments. Selective incorporation 
initially had inquired whether it was possible for any governmental system to 
ensure justice without recognizing the right at issue.131 However, in Duncan v. 
Louisiana, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with this way of framing the 
question.132 Due process challenges did not occur in a vacuum, the Court 
noted, but, rather, within the legal system of a specific state, with all its 
particular institutions and practices.133 A procedure that was not indispensable 
in the abstract nevertheless might be essential to liberty within an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty.134 It was true, for example, that “a 
criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to 
imagine.”135 The process “would make use of alternative guarantees and 
protections which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the English 
and American systems.”136 Nonetheless, since no American states had 
constructed such a process, the right to a jury trial remained essential to liberty 
in the American context.137 Thus, the Court determined that the inquiry under 
selective incorporation should not be whether the right at issue was 
“fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined,”138 
but whether it was “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”139 The 
change had significant implications, because, as the Court noted recently, 
“many of the rights that our Bill of Rights provides for persons accused of 
criminal offenses are virtually unique to this country.”140 Thus, selective 
incorporation meant that the Court’s approach to procedural due process would 
retain an overarching universal framework, yet move in a direction that tended 
to de-emphasize universal analysis in the adjudication of individual cases. 
Indeed, as developed, the new approach placed so much stress in application 
on non-universal considerations that it called into question whether the 
analysis remained essentially universal in character. 
 
 131. Israel, supra note 72, at 383. 
 132. 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 149; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
 140. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010). 
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The Court’s most recent major due process decision reflected both the 
enhanced emphasis on particular arguments and the resulting confusion with 
respect to the basis of interpretation. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the 
Court held, 5-4, that the Second Amendment applied against the states.141 Most 
of the decisions applying Bill of Rights provisions to the states were made in 
selective incorporation’s first decade, but the Second Amendment’s 
applicability had not been determined before McDonald.142 Although the 
Amendment’s “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is not a right of 
criminal procedure, Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion approached the 
case through the lens of selective incorporation, stating, “Unless considerations 
of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that 
protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies 
equally to the Federal Government and the States.”143 Justice Alito (joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, and in part by Justice 
Thomas)144 framed the analysis at the broadest level around whether the core 
right at stake was fundamental, concluding that the right to keep and bear arms 
for individual self-defense was a “basic right.”145 The relevant inquiry, though, 
Justice Alito stressed, was whether the right was “fundamental to our scheme 
of ordered liberty,”146 and whether it was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition” (emphasis in original).147 The analysis turned quickly 
and decisively to considerations that were particular in character, as Justice 
Alito determined that the right at stake had been “recognized by many legal 
systems from ancient times to the present day.”148 His evidence included 
English history from before the Revolution, colonial history, constitutional 
ratification debates, early state constitutions, early legal commentary, and 
subsequent American history.149 The investigation centered on what the 
American people and their cultural forbears believed about the right at stake, 
eschewing examination of the right’s intrinsic character and importance. 
 
 141. The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 142. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. 
 143. Id. at 3050. The statement came in a portion of Justice Alito’s opinion announcing the 
judgment of the Court that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 
(Justice Thomas joined other parts of Alito’s opinion but not the part containing this quotation.) 
 144. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of 
American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges 
and Immunities Clause.”). 
 145. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036. 
 146. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 
 147. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 148. Id. at 3036. 
 149. Id. at 3036–42. 
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In dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Sonia Sotomayor) was willing to work within the selective incorporation 
framework, but he criticized the majority for relying excessively on history.150 
While Justice Breyer challenged the majority’s interpretation of history, he 
argued more fundamentally that exclusive reliance on history was “both wrong 
and dangerous” because “our society has historically made mistakes.”151 
Justice Breyer made room for the Justices’ analysis of the right’s importance 
based on its substantive content. He was interested in how the right at stake fit 
in with “other or broader constitutional objective[s],” and whether any 
“broader constitutional interest or principle supports legal treatment of th[e] 
right as fundamental.”152 The analysis identified basic principles and asked 
whether they implicated Second Amendment rights. More specifically, Justice 
Breyer could discern no close interrelationship between Second Amendment 
rights and “assur[ing] equal respect for individuals” or the protection of 
politically marginalized minorities.153 Unlike rights protected by the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, which had been found 
applicable against the states, the “private self-defense right” at issue in 
McDonald did “not significantly seek to protect individuals who might 
otherwise suffer unfair or inhumane treatment at the hands of a majority.”154 
Justice Breyer, however, did not rely exclusively on analysis of the nature 
of the rights at stake. He also deemed it “essential to consider the recent 
history” of the right at stake to determine if it “remained fundamental over 
time.”155 Thus, he found exclusion of Second Amendment rights supported by 
contemporary societal indicators, including the prevalence of state regulations 
of firearms and the absence of a “popular consensus that the private self-
defense right . . . is fundamental.”156 The investigation demonstrated that 
“every State regulates firearms extensively, and public opinion is sharply 
divided on the appropriate level of regulation.”157 Although Justice Breyer 
criticized the majority for relying exclusively on particular arguments, his 
opinion produced confusion regarding the basis of his interpretive method, as 
he employed particular arguments without explaining their interrelation with 
his apparently universal arguments. That is, he included universal arguments 
but weakened them by failing to explain how they related to the opinion’s 
myriad citations. In sum, then, McDonald reflected the broader ambiguity in 
 
 150. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3122 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 3123. 
 152. Id. at 3125, 3136. 
 153. Id. at 3125. 
 154. Id. 
 155. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3123, 3134 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 3124. 
 157. Id. 
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the Court’s jurisprudence; one camp (in this instance, the majority) 
marginalized universal analysis, while the dissenters undermined their own use 
of universal arguments by failing to establish that they played a role that was 
independent of popular opinion. 
B. The Constitution’s Applicability in Overseas Territories 
Like due process, the issue of the Constitution’s applicability in U.S. 
territories is another area in which the Court early on established an approach 
that carved out a substantial role for universal analysis. Also, as in due process, 
the Court’s jurisprudence in this doctrinal area would later engender confusion 
by incorporating a greater stress on non-universal considerations without 
adequately clarifying how these fundamentally distinct lines of reasoning 
interacted with one another. 
Article IV, Section 3 provides the only constitutional language that speaks 
to the governance of U.S. territories, stating: “The Congress shall have Power 
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this 
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United 
States, or of any particular State.”158 It was established early on that Congress 
had general sovereign powers to govern territories, but questions arose about 
whether constitutional limitations applied in this context.159 The issue figured 
prominently in political battles leading up to the Civil War, with pro-slavery 
partisans arguing that the Constitution precluded congressional interference 
with slavery in the territories, and slavery opponents advocating congressional 
discretion over the matter.160 Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion in Dred 
Scott v. Sanford (1857) adopted the former position.161 Although the Civil War 
overturned or rendered irrelevant critical elements of Scott, questions persisted 
regarding constitutional applicability in territories. Nineteenth-century cases 
adjudicating constitutional claims in territories did not settle the issue, because 
Congress typically enacted legislation providing for the Constitution’s 
applicability. Consequently, when the Court enforced provisions in territories, 
it was not clear if they would have applied in the absence of congressional 
legislation.162 
 
 158. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 159. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and 
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 181–
82 (2002). 
 160. Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and Territorial 
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 824–25 (2005). 
 161. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856). 
 162. See, e.g., Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. 437 (1850) (decision invalidating legislation adopted 
by the territory of Iowa eliminating jury trials for certain civil actions referred both to the Seventh 
Amendment, which guarantees jury trials for civil suits, and to congressional legislation explicitly 
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The issue took on new significance when the United States acquired 
territories in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea in 1898 through the treaty 
ending the Spanish-American War.163 The desirability of the American 
acquisition of overseas territories became a subject of political contention, with 
President William McKinley’s election in 1900 signaling substantial support 
for expansion.164 The controversy was stoked by differing opinions on the 
extent and import of cultural differences between the United States and the 
new territories.165 The country had never before annexed faraway territories 
with large nonwhite populations,166 and many viewed these populations as 
incapable of operating according to American ideas and institutions.167 The 
common assumption of American superiority could be used either to argue that 
territories should be acquired without extending constitutional protections or 
that expansion was infeasible.168 Political and legal considerations intersected 
in the debate over whether constitutional provisions automatically extended to 
residents of the territories.169 The question arose in a different form than it had 
previously because it was not assumed that these territories would become 
states.170 
The Court confronted the question early in the twentieth century in a series 
of decisions known as the Insular Cases.171 Although the earliest of these cases 
principally concerned whether territories were to be treated as foreign 
 
providing for jury trials in the territory); see also Am. Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 466 
(1897) (noting that it could be a matter of dispute whether the Seventh Amendment operated ex 
propio vigore to invalidate a territorial statute upon which the action at issue relied). Similarly, 
the import of decisions suggesting Congress was bound by the First Amendment, Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878), and the Eighth Amendment, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 
130, 136–37 (1878), in the Utah territory was muddied by organic acts explicitly extending these 
protections. The Court, at times, did suggest that constitutional provisions applied of their own 
force in territories, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 347 (1898), but at others noted that the 
question was unresolved, e.g., Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897). See also Burnett, supra note 160, at 
824–31 (“Nevertheless, the very act of statutory extension had raised doubts all along about 
whether the Constitution applied of its own force in the territories . . . .”). 
 163. Edward C. Carter, III, The Extra-Territorial Reach of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination or Does the Privilege ‘Follow the Flag?’, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313, 317–18 (2001). 
 164. Burnett, supra note 160, at 805–06. 
 165. Cleveland, supra note 159, at 208–09. 
 166. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2526 (2005). 
 167. Cleveland, supra note 159, at 209. 
 168. Id. 
 169. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 
11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 24–25 (1994); John P. Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 
31 U. CHI. L. REV. 103, 134 (1964). 
 170. Cleveland, supra note 159, at 209–10. 
 171. The term “Insular Cases” is commonly used to refer to a little over twenty decisions that 
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sometimes varies. Burnett, supra note 160, at 809. 
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countries for purposes of constitutional and statutory provisions regarding 
tariffs,172 they were seen as raising the question of whether the Constitution 
“follow[ed] the flag.”173 Only a handful of the Insular Cases dealt with 
individual rights issues, but they established a general approach that largely 
remains in force.174 
The immediate issue in the first of the Insular Cases, Downes v. Bidwell 
(1901), was the constitutionality of tariffs on oranges from Puerto Rico.175 The 
case presented the question of whether the Constitution applied of its own 
force, because no congressional legislation made the entire Constitution 
applicable in Puerto Rico.176 While a five-member majority upheld the tariff on 
the grounds that Puerto Rico was not part of the United States, the opinions 
offered a variety of approaches to the problem of constitutional applicability.177 
Justice Henry Brown’s opinion announcing the Court’s decision asserted that 
constitutional applicability principally fell within congressional discretion, 
stressing the need for flexibility due to varying conditions in the territories.178 
He found that Congress had not meant to extend the Constitution to Puerto 
Rico.179 Yet Justice Brown suggested that certain constitutional rights, 
“indispensable to a free government,” might apply of their own force.180 There 
were, he wrote, “principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon 
character which need no expression in constitutions or statutes to give them 
effect or to secure dependencies against legislation manifestly hostile to their 
real interests.”181 These principles included due process, equal protection of the 
laws, access to courts of justice, and the freedoms of religion, speech, and 
press.182 Justice Brown distinguished these natural rights from: 
artificial or remedial rights . . . peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence . . . 
. [R]ights to citizenship, to suffrage . . . and to the particular methods of 
procedure pointed out in the Constitution, which are peculiar to Anglo-Saxon 
 
 172. Burnett, supra note 160, at 835. 
 173. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 
853, 872–73, 872 n.103 (1990). 
 174. Burnett, supra note 160, at 835–36. 
 175. 182 U.S. 244, 247 (1901). The tariffs were challenged as violations of Article 1, section 
8, which provides that “all Duties, Imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 176. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249. 
 177. Id. at 244, 249. 
 178. Id. at 279–80, 282. 
 179. Id. at 279–80. 
 180. Id. at 282–83. 
 181. Downes, 182 U.S. at 280. 
 182. Id. at 282. 
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jurisprudence, and some of which have already been held by the States to be 
unnecessary to the proper protection of individuals.183 
Justice Brown’s categorization of natural versus artificial rights effectively 
distinguished universally grounded rights from those with a basis that was 
exclusively particular in character. 
Concurring, Justice Edward White drew a distinction between 
“incorporated” territories, which were an integral part of the United States, and 
unincorporated territories, which were “merely appurtenant [to the United 
States] as a possession.”184 In plainer language, incorporated territories seemed 
to be those expected to become states.185 On Justice White’s approach, the 
entire Constitution applied of its own force only in incorporated territories.186 
Since Congress decided whether to incorporate, Justice White’s approach was 
similar to Justice Brown’s in looking first to congressional intent.187 Justice 
White’s opinion also was similar to Justice Brown’s in suggesting that a 
special category of rights might apply of their own force regardless of 
congressional intent, that is, even in territories Congress had not chosen to 
incorporate. There might be, he wrote, “inherent, although unexpressed, 
principles which are the basis of all free government which cannot be with 
impunity transcended,” and “restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they 
cannot be transgressed, although not expressed in so many words in the 
Constitution.”188 Congress could not “destroy the liberties of the people of 
Porto Rico by exercising in their regard powers against freedom and justice 
which the Constitution has absolutely denied.”189 
Hawaii v. Mankichi (1903) raised the question of whether specific Bill of 
Rights provisions applied in the territories.190 The joint resolution of Congress 
making Hawaii a U.S. territory in 1898 had stated that existing laws would 
remain in force so long as they were not “contrary to the Constitution of the 
United States.”191 Congress formally incorporated Hawaii into the United 
 
 183. Id. at 282–83. 
 184. Id. at 342 (White, J., concurring). 
 185. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (referring to an 
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States in June 1900 and made provisions for the use of grand and petit juries 
requiring unanimous verdicts for conviction.192 Between annexation and 
incorporation, the defendant was charged without a grand jury and convicted 
of manslaughter by a 9–3 jury verdict.193 The question was whether the Fifth 
Amendment’s grand jury requirement and Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury 
trial (which at that time mandated unanimous verdicts) applied during the 
period before the congressional action in 1900.194 Again writing for the Court 
in a 5–4 decision, Justice Brown conceded that the conviction would have been 
invalid if the 1898 congressional language were interpreted literally,195 but 
concluded that immediate imposition of all constitutional protections would 
have been so impractical that Congress could not have intended it.196 Applying 
the principle that only rights “fundamental in their nature” were applicable 
regardless of legislation, Justice Brown concluded that the rights at stake in 
Mankichi did not extend automatically, because they concerned “merely a 
method of procedure” that experience had proven beneficial.197 Applying the 
same approach he had in Downes, Justice White reasoned that since Hawaii 
was unincorporated at the time of the trial, the question was whether the rights 
at issue were fundamental.198 Justice White observed that the Court had taken a 
similar tack in addressing which procedural protections applied against the 
states via due process.199 The Court in those cases inquired whether rights 
necessarily were protected “in every free government,”200 such that their denial 
would “work a denial of fundamental rights.”201 In its due process 
jurisprudence, the Court already had determined that the rights at issue in 
Mankichi were not fundamental,202 and Justice White considered these 
precedents binding in the territorial context as well.203 
Dorr v. United States (1904) raised anew the applicability of the right to a 
criminal jury trial in a newly acquired territory, this time the Philippines.204 
The defendant had been charged with criminal libel under territorial law, 
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which did not provide jury trials.205 A majority for the first time adopted 
Justice White’s doctrine of incorporation206 and endorsed the position 
developed by Justices Brown and White that a subset of constitutional rights 
applied of their own force even in unincorporated territories.207 There were 
“fundamental right[s] which go[] wherever the jurisdiction of the United States 
extends.”208 Since Congress had not extended the right to a jury trial through 
legislation, the outcome turned on whether the right to a jury trial was 
fundamental.209 In addressing that question, Justice William Day cited the 
universal formulations articulated by Justices Brown and White, and an 1890 
case stating that congressional regulation of territories was subject to: 
those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated 
in the Constitution . . . but these limitations would exist . . . by inference and 
the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives all its 
powers, than by any express and direct application of its provisions.210 
Justice Day examined the character of the right at stake and found that it was 
not fundamental.211 Drawing on essential requirements that the Court had 
identified in its procedural due process jurisprudence, including a court with 
jurisdiction and the opportunity to be heard in one’s own defense, Justice Day 
concluded that it was possible for a legal system to preserve these elements 
without providing jury trials, and the Philippines seemed to have such a system 
in place.212 Consequently, the right to a jury trial did not automatically apply in 
the territories.213 
Later decisions confirmed Justice White’s incorporation doctrine. 
Rassmussen v. United States (1905), for example, held the right to a jury trial 
applicable in Alaska, because the territory was incorporated, 214 and Balzac v. 
Porto Rico (1922) held that the jury trial provisions in Article III, and the Sixth 
and Seventh Amendments, did not apply in Puerto Rico, an unincorporated 
territory, because they were not fundamental.215 The Court treated it as a 
general proposition, “clearly settled,” that jury trial rights “do not apply to 
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 207. Carter, supra note 163, at 319. 
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territory belonging to the United States which has not been incorporated into 
the Union.”216 By contrast, the Court also indicated as a general proposition 
that other “fundamental personal rights” did apply of their own force, 
including “that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.”217 
While the Court has maintained the outlines of the approach it adopted in 
the Insular Cases, subsequent cases, however, have suggested a greater 
emphasis on considerations of a non-universal character in determining the 
applicability of rights in U.S. territories. The Court said little about the 
Constitution in the territories immediately after the Insular Cases,218 but the 
problems they addressed reemerged decades later. Reid v. Covert (1957) raised 
the question of whether constitutional protections were available to dependents 
of American military personnel tried overseas by U.S. military courts for 
offenses allegedly committed outside the United States.219 The Court held that 
American citizens were entitled to a jury trial even when tried in a foreign 
country.220 Justice Black’s plurality opinion (joined by Justices William 
Brennan, William Douglas, and Chief Justice Earl Warren) recognized that the 
Insular Cases were inapposite but examined them as part of a broader look at 
the Constitution’s applicability when the Government “acts outside the 
continental United States.”221 Though the opinion distinguished the Insular 
Cases rather than overruling them, Justice Black expressed disapproval with 
their approach, stating that “neither [the Insular Cases] nor their reasoning 
should be given any further expansion.”222 The notion that constitutional 
protections could be considered “inoperative when they become inconvenient . 
. . [was] a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the 
benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our 
Government.”223 Justice Black could “find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, 
for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’ 
which were explicitly fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal 
Government by the Constitution.”224 He contended that the government never 
 
 216. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 304–05. 
 217. Id. at 312–13 The Court also implied that the First Amendment rights to freedom of 
speech and press applied of their own force, because they addressed a claim rooted in these rights, 
although they did not find merit in the claim. Id. at 314. 
 218. Burnett, supra note 160, at 810–11. 
 219. 354 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1957). 
 220. Id. at 40–41. 
 221. Id. at 8. 
 222. Id. at 14. 
 223. Id. at 14. 
 224. Reid, 354 U.S. at 9. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RIGHTS WITHOUT A BASE 131 
was free from the mandates of the Constitution, which was the source of 
government power.225 
In concurring opinions, Justices Frankfurter and the second John Marshall 
Harlan each confirmed the continued validity of the Insular Cases, while 
emphasizing that questions about constitutional applicability had to be 
approached with an eye to the circumstances of each case.226 Justice 
Frankfurter stressed the importance of the history, customs, and conditions 
pertaining to each situation in which questions about the Constitution’s 
applicability arose.227 Justice Harlan, too, argued that the Insular Cases called 
for careful contextual analysis.228 The Court’s task was not to decide across the 
board whether a specific right applied. Rather, the Court had to examine “the 
particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives,” 
along with considering whether application of the right in the circumstances 
would be “impracticable and anomalous.”229 
Unlike Reid, Torres v. Puerto Rico (1979) presented squarely the issue of 
constitutional applicability in the territories.230 The question was whether 
Puerto Rico, still an unincorporated territory,231 was bound by the Fourth 
Amendment.232 Pursuant to Puerto Rican legislation authorizing police to 
search the belongings of anyone entering the Commonwealth from the United 
States, the defendant had been searched by officers at the airport despite the 
absence of articulable grounds for suspicion.233 Although the Court 
unanimously invalidated the search, the decision manifested disagreement 
among the Justices regarding the proper approach to the issue. Chief Justice 
Warren Burger’s opinion for a five-member majority indicated approval of the 
Insular Cases.234 Like the majority in those cases, Chief Justice Burger 
expressed concern that immediate imposition of the entire Constitution in all 
territories “would create such severe practical difficulties under certain 
circumstances as to prohibit the United States from exercising its constitutional 
power to occupy and acquire new lands.”235 As a result, attempts to impose the 
full Constitution might lead to injustice. In deciding whether the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections extended to Puerto Rico, Chief Justice Burger’s 
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analysis focused on local experience, inquiring whether imposition of the 
rights at stake would compromise national interests or produce unfairness.236 In 
conducting that inquiry, Chief Justice Burger placed great weight on the 
determinations made by Congress and the people of Puerto Rico.237 Observing 
that Congress had extended Fourth Amendment rights to Puerto Rico in the 
period before the Commonwealth had its own constitutional system, the Chief 
Justice wrote that a “legislative determination that a constitutional provision 
practically and beneficially may be implemented in a territory is entitled to 
great weight.”238 He also stressed that when Puerto Rico had the opportunity to 
adopt its own constitution, it chose to include those rights as well.239 Rather 
than analyzing the intrinsic character and importance of the right at stake, the 
decision turned on whether application of the right was practical in the specific 
context. Moreover, even in addressing that question, the majority deferred to 
legislative judgments. 
Although the Insular Cases remain good law,240 Torres showed that the 
subject remained controversial. Concurring, Justice Brennan (joined by 
Justices Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun) questioned 
the continued vitality of the Insular Cases,241 and Justice Brennan (joined by 
Justice Marshall) again expressed dissatisfaction with the Insular Cases in 
Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States, citing Justice’s Black opinion in Reid for 
the proposition that they were “limited to their facts long ago.”242 Dissenting in 
Harris v. Rosario (where the majority upheld an Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program which provided lower reimbursements to Puerto 
Rico against an equal protection challenge),243 Justice Marshall stated that “the 
present validity of [the Insular Cases] is questionable.”244 Referring to Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence in Torres, he added: “At least four Members of this 
Court are of the view that all provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to Puerto 
Rico.”245 
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The Court’s limited post-Insular Cases jurisprudence has been 
characterized by a greater emphasis on the circumstances of the specific 
context. The Insular Cases had established a universal approach for 
determining if rights applied in unincorporated territories; rights only applied 
of their own force if they were “fundamental in their nature,” or represented 
“inherent, although unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free 
government.”246 The rights that satisfied these standards were deemed to apply 
in all territories regardless of congressional legislation.247 Using this 
framework, the Court examined the character of rights regarding grand and 
petit juries, and concluded that they did not qualify since they were not 
indispensable to a fair system of justice.248 Although the Court nominally has 
followed the Insular Cases, the post-Insular Cases touching on the issue have 
not engaged the universal component of the approach that the Insular Cases 
established. In a number of cases, the Court has held that rights applied to 
Puerto Rico without explanation or analysis.249 In Torres, the Court did not 
examine the intrinsic importance of the rights outlined in the Fourth 
Amendment, but instead focused on enactments by Congress and Puerto Rico, 
and the specific experience and history of the Commonwealth.250 Although not 
itself involving U.S. territories, Boumediene v. Bush (2008) read the Insular 
Cases as linking the application of constitutional rights with the evolving 
conditions in a specific territory.251 
The emphasis on specific circumstances in determining the applicability of 
rights was a departure from the approach established by the Insular Cases. The 
Insular Cases determined that Congress needed flexibility in deciding which 
rights extended to newly acquired territories due to the varying 
circumstances.252 In order to afford Congress the necessary flexibility, the 
Insular Cases left a good deal of room for congressional discretion. While the 
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entire Constitution would apply in incorporated territories, it was up to 
Congress to decide which territories to incorporate.253 The first step in the 
Court’s analysis was to determine if Congress intended to extend constitutional 
protections. Thus far, to be sure, the Insular Cases stressed the importance of 
accommodating specific circumstances and the determinations made by 
Congress. However, the approach also indicated that congressional discretion 
was not limitless, because some rights were so important that they applied in 
all territories regardless of legislation. The Court appealed to universal 
standards as a frame for identifying the set of rights that did not vary according 
to circumstance and congressional intent. Attention to circumstances and 
universality worked hand in hand, because universal considerations set bounds 
around the area within which legislative discretion would be allowed free rein. 
However, the approach used by the Court in Torres undermined the role that 
universal reasoning was supposed to play in this framework. Chief Justice 
Burger’s opinion emphasized particular considerations not simply in 
determining whether Congress had intended to extend the Fourth Amendment 
to Puerto Rico, but even in determining whether it was one of the rights that 
applied in the absence of legislation to that effect. 
The role of universal arguments also is unclear in the opinions of those 
Justices who have expressed dissatisfaction with the Insular Cases. Concurring 
in Torres, Justice Brennan wrote: “Whatever the validity of the [Insular Cases] 
in the particular historical context in which they were decided, those cases are 
clearly not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth 
Amendment—or any other provision of the Bill of Rights—to the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the 1970’s.”254 The short opinion could be 
read in either of two ways. Advancing a non-universal line of justification, 
Justice Brennan might have been advocating a “total incorporation” approach 
for the territories, applying all Bill of Rights provisions by virtue of their 
enactment. Alternatively, the opinion could be read as accepting the universal 
framework of the Insular Cases and determining that all of the Bill of Rights 
provisions qualified as essential to free government. The former argument 
would represent a repudiation of the Insular Cases; such a significant departure 
should be stated explicitly. The universal argument, if it is what Justice 
Brennan intended, also calls for explanation, especially since the Court’s 
incorporation jurisprudence never has held that all Bill of Rights provisions 
enjoy protected status as fundamental rights.255 Without explanation of why the 
rights apply of their own force in territories, opposition to the Insular Cases is 
undermined. 
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C. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
No doctrinal area better captures the ambiguity at the heart of 
constitutional law than the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment. Early Eighth Amendment cases could be interpreted as 
incorporating citations of prevalent practices within an essentially universal 
analysis. More recently, however, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been 
characterized by a split between two competing approaches. One of these 
approaches has rejected reliance on universal arguments entirely. A competing 
approach has continued to insist on a role for universal analysis, but has called 
into question the independent role of that analysis by training the bulk of its 
attention on measuring fluctuations in public attitudes. 
In its decisions interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,256 
the Court early on introduced appeals to universal standards. In, for example, 
In re Kemmler (which upheld the electric chair as a method of execution), the 
Court stated that “cruel” implied “something inhuman and barbarous, 
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”257 In an influential 
dissenting opinion in O’Neil v. Vermont, Justice Stephen Field used universal 
arguments to support his view that a sentence of over $6,000 in fines for 
illegally selling liquor violated the Clause.258 It was uncontroversial that the 
Clause applied to torturous punishments, but Justice Field maintained that it 
also prohibited disproportionate punishments.259 Cumulatively punishing the 
defendant for hundreds of sales as separate offenses “was greatly beyond 
anything required by any humane law for the offences.”260 Given the nature of 
the offense, it was: 
hard to believe that any man of right feeling and heart can refrain from 
shuddering . . . [T]he judgment of mankind would be that the punishment was 
not only an unusual but a cruel one, and a cry of horror would rise from every 
civilized and Christian community of the country against it.261 
 
 256. Since the Court did not consistently view the Amendment as binding on states until the 
late 1940s, see Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947), many decisions leave unclear 
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 257. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). 
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Justice Field referred to existing practices in showing that the sentence was 
inhumanely disproportionate, noting that it was far more severe than what the 
defendant would have received for manslaughter, forgery, or perjury.262 
The Court articulated an approach that was both universal and evolutionary 
in its first decision invalidating a sentence prescribed by a legislature. The 
defendant in Weems v. United States (1910) was convicted in the Philippines, 
then a U.S. territory, under a statute criminalizing the use of false documents 
by government officials.263 The statute provided a minimum sentence of twelve 
years of hard labor while wearing chains, and a continuing loss of civil rights 
after the prison term.264 Since the Constitution was intended to endure 
indefinitely, the Court reasoned, its application had to expand beyond evils 
known at the time of enactment.265 Constitutional provisions embodied general 
principles whose application had to evolve with changing conditions; 
otherwise, “[r]ights declared in words might be lost in reality.”266 To discern 
the Clause’s evolving meaning, Justice Joseph McKenna’s majority opinion 
drew on universal principles, resting the opinion on the “precept of justice that 
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”267 
Justice McKenna linked an evolutionary approach with both universal 
standards and societal attitudes, stating that the Clause “may be . . . 
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as 
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”268 The opinion 
investigated practices to evaluate proportionality, considering laws from a 
variety of jurisdictions in the United States and the Philippines, finding it 
relevant that individuals convicted of more serious crimes had received less 
severe sentences.269 
Trop v. Dulles (1958) built on the approach the Court had outlined in 
Weems, referring both to universal standards and existing practices in 
interpreting the changing meaning of rights.270 Trop, a native-born American 
citizen, was convicted by court-martial of wartime desertion while serving in 
French Morocco during the Second World War.271 The 5-4 decision 
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invalidated a sentence depriving him of citizenship.272 Chief Justice Warren’s 
opinion for the majority273 introduced a universal standard that has remained 
central to the Court’s jurisprudence: “The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”274 The Amendment 
imposed a “basic prohibition against inhuman treatment”275 and mandated that 
the state’s “power to punish . . . [must] be exercised within the limits of 
civilized standards.”276 Chief Justice Warren also reaffirmed an evolutionary 
approach, noting that the Clause’s words “are not precise, . . .” and “their scope 
is not static.”277 The Amendment, he wrote, “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”278 
Citing a U.N. study showing that only two of eighty-four countries surveyed 
prescribed denationalization as a punishment for desertion, he concluded that 
statelessness was “a condition deplored in the international community of 
democracies” and that there was “virtual unanimity” among the “civilized 
nations of the world” that it should not be imposed.279 Chief Justice Warren 
also engaged in his own consideration of the character of the punishment, 
finding that it was cruel because it amounted to a “total destruction of the 
individual’s status in organized society” and, thus, left an individual with no 
rights.280 This condition, subjecting “the individual to a fate of ever-increasing 
fear and distress,” was “a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for 
it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the 
development.”281 Though the dissenters interpreted the evidence of practices 
differently, they accepted crucial elements of Chief Justice Warren’s 
approach,282 including reliance on universal reasoning and international 
practices. Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices Clark, Burton, and Harlan) 
spoke of the Clause as embodying “enlightened concepts of ‘humane 
justice,’”283 and cited U.N. documents in his consideration of the practices of 
“civilized nations.”284 
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The Court’s earlier, major decisions on the Clause suggested that the 
citation of governmental practices could play a supporting role with an 
overarching universal analysis. Thus, universal standards required that 
punishments be proportional, and surveys of punishments could help in 
determining the proportionality of the punishment at issue.285 Likewise, 
overwhelming consensus against a punishment’s acceptability could support a 
judgment that the punishment was inhumane.286 More recently, however, the 
Court’s jurisprudence has been characterized by an ongoing clash between two 
competing approaches, with one approach repudiating universal arguments, 
and a competing approach ostensibly defending universal arguments while 
failing in practice to establish that they are integral to rights interpretation. 
The most prominent debates in recent decades over the Clause’s meaning 
have arisen in cases challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty, 
beginning with Furman v. Georgia (1972), which invalidated death penalty 
statutes on the grounds that they applied the punishment in an arbitrary 
manner.287 Many states amended statutes in response to Furman, seeking to 
address the Court’s concerns, and in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court 
upheld legislation providing standards to be applied at a separate sentencing 
trial following a guilty verdict.288 Since Furman and the cases on states’ 
attempts to meet its concerns, the Court has addressed a number of questions 
concerning the constitutionality of death as punishment for certain classes of 
crimes or defendants. 
Five years after Furman, the Court held, 7-2, in Coker v. Georgia (1977) 
that death was excessive punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman.289 In the opinion, Justice Byron White (joined by Justices Blackmun, 
Stewart, and Stevens) stated that a punishment violated the Amendment not 
only if it was barbaric, but also if it was “‘excessive’ in relation to the crime 
committed.”290 Citing Gregg, White stated more specifically that a punishment 
was excessive if it: “(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals 
of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime.”291 The disproportionality analysis included 
contemporary societal values, and the question, specifically, was the public 
acceptability of death as punishment for raping an adult.292 
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The plurality in Gregg used practices in a notably distinctive manner. 
Justice White’s opinion observed that a majority of states had not authorized 
death as a punishment for rape in the fifty years before Coker.293 Moreover, 
while sixteen states had authorized death for rape before Furman, only three 
reinstated that penalty after Furman’s invalidation of all death penalty laws.294 
With these figures as support, Justice White considered that state legislation 
“weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable 
penalty for raping an adult woman.”295 Thus, Justice White counted the 
examination of state legislation against constitutionality notwithstanding a 
substantial degree of dissensus. As noted above,296 the Court previously had 
pointed to uniformity of practice as evidence that a right had a universal basis 
and was protected. Conversely, the Court had counted absence of uniformity as 
counting against a right’s protected status, viewing dissensus as a sign that 
reasonable people could disagree.297 Here, Justice White viewed legislation as 
weighing against constitutionality on an issue where public attitudes were 
divided and in flux. While the opinion indicated that societal values analysis 
was not decisive (since “the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear”),298Justice White’s analysis focused above 
all on the accounting of state practices. 
The majority used a similar line of reasoning in Enmund v. Florida (1982) 
to hold death a disproportionate punishment for robbery where the defendant 
did not intend or commit homicide.299 Again penning the Court’s opinion, 
Justice White noted that of the thirty-six states with capital punishment only a 
“small minority” of eight imposed death for this category of crime.300 In 
another nine states, the sentencing body could impose death for the crime 
depending on the circumstances.301 Together, only about a third of the states 
authorized death for robbery without homicide.302 Additionally, of the eight 
states that had enacted new death penalty statutes in the previous four years, 
none had provided death for non-homicidal robbery.303 Justice White found 
that the evidence “weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the 
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crime at issue.”304 Thus, the majority again counted legislation as supporting 
unconstitutionality even where state practices were far from uniform. 
The Court has employed a similar line of reasoning in cases addressing the 
constitutionality of death as a punishment for certain classes of offenders. In 
Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), for example, the Court held, 5-3, that death 
could not be imposed on a person who was under sixteen years of age at the 
time of the crime.305 In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, 
Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) found 
that the evidence supported an “unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of 
the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to the 
conscience of the community.”306 Fourteen states had no death penalty, and 
eighteen states with capital punishment had minimum ages of at least sixteen 
years, while nineteen states did not establish a minimum age.307 Evidence 
concerning jury verdicts was persuasive too, as it had been forty years since a 
jury imposed death on a defendant under sixteen.308 In addition, Justice 
Stevens referred to “the views that have been expressed by respected 
professional organizations,”309 noting that the American Bar Association and 
American Law Institute opposed execution of juveniles.310 Justice Stevens also 
pointed to evidence from other countries. American opposition to execution of 
juveniles was consistent with the views of “other nations that share our Anglo-
American heritage, and . . . the leading members of the Western European 
community.”311 The United Kingdom and New Zealand, which retained the 
death penalty for some crimes, did not allow the execution of juveniles.312 The 
death penalty had been abolished in a number of Western European countries, 
most of Australia, and (at least with regard to juveniles) the Soviet Union.313 In 
his independent judicial assessment, Justice Stevens concluded that the death 
penalty for persons under sixteen did not “measurably contribute[]” to 
deterrence or retribution, stressing psychological differences between adults 
and juveniles.314 
For Justice Scalia (joined in dissent by Justice White and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist), the crucial fact was that almost forty percent of the states, 
including a majority of death penalty states, allowed imposition of death when 
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juveniles were tried as adults, which could include persons under the age of 
sixteen.315 If forty percent of states did not rule out the punishment, there was 
no consensus against it. Justice Scalia rejected international sources, because 
only American attitudes mattered. The practice was constitutional “even if that 
position contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world. We must never 
forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are 
expounding.”316 Justice Scalia argued against independent judicial assessment 
of the punishment’s appropriateness. Only original understanding of the Clause 
and evolving American standards of decency could support a finding of 
unconstitutionality.317 Justice Stevens had not addressed original 
understanding, and his consideration of international sources opened the door 
to subjective judging.318 
While Thompson held death could not be imposed on persons under 
sixteen, Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) upheld capital punishment for persons 
sixteen or older.319 Justice Scalia’s opinion for a four-person plurality (joined 
by Justices Kennedy and White and Chief Justice Rehnquist) again stressed 
that the relevant standard was American attitudes, with legislation as the most 
significant evidence.320 Of thirty-seven death penalty states, twenty-two 
allowed execution of sixteen-year-olds, and twenty-five allowed execution of 
seventeen-year-olds.321 This data did “not establish the degree of national 
consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular 
punishment cruel and unusual.”322 Justice Scalia limited the societal values 
investigation to legislation and sentences actually imposed, refusing to 
consider public opinion polls or positions adopted by professional associations: 
We decline . . . to rest constitutional law upon such uncertain foundations. A 
revised national consensus so broad, so clear, and so enduring as to justify a 
permanent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must appear in 
the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the people have 
approved.323 
Urging that the Court must not “replace judges of the law with a committee of 
philosopher-kings,”324 he reiterated his opposition to judicial assessment of a 
punishment’s acceptability: 
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[O]ur job is to identify the ‘evolving standards of decency’; to determine, not 
what they should be, but what they are . . . . [W]e emphatically reject [the] 
suggestion that the issues . . . permit us to apply ‘our own informed judgment’ 
. . . regarding the desirability of permitting the death penalty for crimes by 16- 
and 17-year-olds.325 
The Court upheld the execution of persons who were mentally retarded in 
Penry v. Lynaugh (1989),326 but reversed itself in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 
based on intervening changes in public attitudes and practices. 327 At the time 
of Penry, two states prohibited execution of mentally retarded persons.328 Even 
adding the fourteen non-death-penalty states, this did not show inconsistency 
with evolving standards of decency.329 In Atkins, Justice Stevens’ opinion for 
the Court observed that eighteen states barred the execution of the mentally 
retarded, sixteen more than at the time of Penry.330 Since twelve states had no 
death penalty, this meant thirty states did not sanction execution of the 
mentally retarded.331 The opinion emphasized “the consistency of the direction 
of change,”332 observing that no state that prohibited the execution of the 
mentally retarded had removed the prohibition.333 The majority also noted 
opposition to execution of the mentally retarded by a wide range of 
professional and religious organizations, and polling data that indicated “a 
widespread consensus among Americans . . . that executing the mentally 
retarded is wrong.”334 Citing evidence that the challenged punishment was 
“overwhelmingly disapproved” by the “world community,” the Court stated 
that the consistency of international sources “lends further support to our 
conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the 
issue.”335 Finally, executing mentally retarded persons was excessive, due to 
lessened personal culpability.336 The Court’s opinion in Atkins bore significant 
similarities to its opinion in Lawrence. In both instances, the direction of recent 
changes in state legislation was considered most relevant. A trend towards 
observance could support a right’s emergence even amidst dissensus. 
In dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia argued 
that the prohibition of executing mentally retarded persons by eighteen states, 
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less than half of the states with a death penalty, did not establish a national 
consensus.337 The data did not show anything close to the consensus shown in 
previous cases where the Court had invalidated punishments.338 Moreover, 
many states with legislation prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded had 
adopted the legislation recently, suggesting that public attitudes were fluid.339 
The Atkins dissenters also continued their attack on the majority’s reliance on 
societal values indicators beyond legislation and juries and on judicial 
assessment of moral acceptability. In their view, the majority opinion “rested . 
. . upon nothing but the personal views” of the Justices.340 Yet, since the 
Justices lacked authority to impose their own feelings, only consideration of 
actions by legislatures and juries could “be reconciled with the undeniable 
precepts that the democratic branches of government and individual sentencing 
juries are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to 
the complex societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of 
publicly acceptable criminal punishments.”341 
Just as Atkins overturned a 13-year-old decision, Roper v. Simmons (2005) 
overturned Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), holding, 5-4, that execution of persons 
under eighteen violated the Clause.342 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
majority in Roper used the same framework as Atkins, and the figures on state 
legislation were similar. By the time Roper was decided, 18 states barred 
execution of juveniles.343 Since twelve states had no death penalty, thirty 
altogether did not authorize execution of juveniles.344 Justice Kennedy viewed 
this evidence as supporting a finding that societal standards were no longer 
consistent with execution of minors.345 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Roper 
also considered sentences in foreign countries. Only seven countries other than 
the United States had executed minors since 1990, and all of them had 
abolished or disavowed the practice.346 The United Kingdom, whose practice 
was of special interest due to the “historic ties between our countries and in 
light of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins,” abolished death for juveniles 
decades before abolishing the penalty altogether.347 A number of treaties 
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banned execution of minors, including the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, and the United States was one of only two countries that had not 
ratified it.348 In short, “the United States now stands alone in a world that has 
turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”349 Although the “opinion of 
the world community” was “not controlling,” it did provide instruction and 
“respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”350 The 
Court’s determination that death was disproportionate for minors found 
“confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in 
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death 
penalty.”351 It did “not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its 
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental 
rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those 
same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”352 The majority’s 
independent judgment also led to the conclusion that death was 
disproportionate when imposed on juveniles.353 Capital punishment for minors 
served neither deterrence nor retribution in light of the diminished culpability 
of minors for their crimes, due in part to psychological differences between 
juveniles and adults.354 
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Clarence Thomas, argued that the count of states opposing execution of minors 
should not include those with no capital punishment.355 The inquiry concerned 
attitudes about executing minors, not capital punishment generally. Only 47% 
of death penalty states prohibited execution of minors: “Words have no 
meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a 
national consensus.”356 Previous cases “required overwhelming opposition to a 
challenged practice, generally over a long period of time.”357 Justice Scalia 
renewed his argument against reliance on international sources. The majority’s 
“basic premise . . . that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of 
the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”358 At any rate, the Court was 
inconsistent in the weight it accorded international practices. For example, the 
rest of the world rejected strict application of the exclusionary rule, and the 
United States was one of only six countries in the world that allowed abortion 
 
 348. Id. at 576. 
 349. Id. at 577. 
 350. Id. at 578. 
 351. Id. at 575. 
 352. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 353. Id. at 571–72. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 356. Id. at 609. 
 357. Roper, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 358. Id. at 624. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RIGHTS WITHOUT A BASE 145 
on demand up to the point of viability.359 The majority, Justice Scalia charged, 
used foreign law to set aside established principles of American law, not to 
reinforce them.360 The fact that the United States had not endorsed treaty 
provisions banning the execution of minors underscored the lack of an 
American consensus against execution of juveniles. 
Two competing frameworks, then, have emerged in the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. One has rejected 
independent judicial assessment and has rested adjudication entirely on 
particular arguments. The other has combined independent judicial assessment 
according to universal standards with particular arguments. Justices backing 
the role of universal arguments in the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence have been careful to say that the Court should engage in its own 
normative assessment of a challenged punishment’s validity,361 suggesting that 
this assessment is independent of contemporary societal values. But the Court 
has not clarified adequately the relationship between the universal and non-
universal elements of their opinions. For instance, what if the independent 
normative assessment and the analysis of contemporary societal values point in 
opposite directions?362 The question remains unanswered. The resulting 
ambiguity jeopardizes the independence of the normative assessment, 
especially in light of the Justices’ extensive debates over the proper way to 
measure public attitudes. The prolonged discussions on how to count the 
number of states approving of a punishment furthers the impression that shifts 
in public attitudes are playing the primary role in interpretation. 
D. Reliance on State Practices and Foreign Law 
Confusion regarding the basis of rights interpretations is magnified by a 
recent intensification in the Court’s attention to state practices as a basis for 
rights interpretation. While citation of state practices is not new, scholars have 
begun recognizing its increasing role.363 Indicators of legal policies as adopted 
and applied by states include jury behavior, prosecutorial decisions, and, 
especially, state legislation. Quantitative analysis of state practices as an 
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interpretive tool is most familiar in Eighth Amendment cases,364 but it is 
commonly used365 by Justices across the ideological spectrum366 in other areas 
as well, including substantive and procedural due process,367 and the Fourth 
and Sixth Amendments.368 The citation of state practices is not problematic in 
itself. The Justices at times have used state practices in a manner that produces 
no confusion regarding the basis of decision. For instance, state practices may 
support empirical claims, such as that a given policy has proven infeasible in 
implementation.369 Reliance on state practices, however, can be problematic 
for either of two reasons. First, it is problematic if used in a manner suggesting 
that shifts in the popularity of practices can swing the meaning of rights.370 
Second, the citation of state practices alongside universal arguments without an 
explanation of the interrelation produces uncertainty regarding the basis of 
decision.371 
Confusion in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the basis of rights also is 
exacerbated by the Justices’ insufficiently explained references to foreign law. 
Foreign citations are less frequent than reference to state practices (although 
they have received greater attention from scholars)372 but common enough to 
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merit attention, especially given their role in prominent cases373 and their 
apparently increasing prevalence in Supreme Court opinions.374 Judges are 
wise when considering empirical questions375 to glean insights from the 
experiences of a variety of jurisdictions, both domestic and international.376 
The question is whether foreign practices shape the bounds that constitutional 
rights place around government actions.377 We can envision ways of 
considering foreign law that would not amount to an expanded attitudinal 
survey. The decisions of foreign adjudicative bodies might provide insightful 
ways of thinking about rights. The Justices, however, generally do not engage 
the reasoning behind the foreign practices.378 Foreign legal developments also 
might point to an overwhelming consensus, which would be seen as evidence 
that a right was indispensable to liberty. But the Justices have not articulated 
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such an argument,379 and the judges often cite foreign law even when 
considerable dissensus remains.380 If foreign citations are supposed to support 
a particular argument, then we would expect to see an explanation of why 
popular preferences outside the United States bear directly on the collective 
decision-making authority of the American people. Indeed, while exclusive 
particularists are wrong to rule out any place for universal reasoning, they are 
right to suggest that only domestic popular preferences are relevant to 
interpretation rooted in popular will.381 In the absence of an adequate 
explanation of how foreign law fits into the analysis, the Justices’ citation of 
foreign law is problematic, because it reinforces the impression that rights 
interpretation is responsive to a tallying of public opinion, with the survey now 
extended beyond American borders. Moreover, as with state practices, the 
Justices have cited foreign law alongside universal arguments without 
explaining the interrelation. 
As noted, Justices in an earlier time more often made clear how the 
investigation of prevalent practices served a subsidiary role within an 
overarching universal argument.382 One approach was to examine practices in 
jurisdictions dedicated to the same universal standards the Justices were 
employing. That is, observing practices within free, republican societies could 
be helpful in discerning the essential requirements of free, republican 
government. The examination of practices sometimes extended beyond 
American borders. Uniform observance of a practice might count as evidence 
of its indispensability. Conversely, a lack of consensus might count as 
evidence against the right’s indispensable nature. On this approach, the 
overarching standard was unambiguously universal, and practices served as 
evidence for or against a right’s universal status. The Justices sometimes 
examined practices with an eye to the nature of the beliefs supporting them. In 
these instances, the investigation focused on how often the right was observed 
specifically because it was believed to enjoy universal status. The governing 
standard was universal, and practices served as evidence bearing on the 
standard’s meaning and application. By contrast, in prominent contemporary 
decisions, like Atkins v. Virginia (2002), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and Roper 
v. Simmons (2005), the Court has relied on recent shifts in public attitudes to 
support new interpretations of rights on issues where considerable dissensus 
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remained.383 In such opinions, the investigation of practices was part of a 
broader investigation into evolving societal attitudes. The inquiry kicked off 
with data on recent trends in state legislation, and included additional sources, 
such as opinions of professional associations, public opinion, and international 
practices. This treatment of data suggested that attitudinal shifts directly altered 
the meaning of rights.384 
Confusion regarding the basis of decision is exacerbated when Justices cite 
foreign and state practices in the same breath without explaining if, or how, 
they serve the same argument. Scholarship typically treats citation of state and 
foreign practices as separate topics. Yet the most important thing about them is 
what they share: they both are part of a judicial methodology that appeals to 
indicators of societal attitudes without explaining why rights should fluctuate 
with attitudinal trends or whether such trends trump universal arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
Justices using universal arguments have defended them as representing an 
exercise of the Justices’ independent judgment, essential to constitutional 
rights operating as an independent check on majority power that is not tied to 
errors of the past. That aim is undermined by the Justices’ equivocation, which 
calls into question whether universal arguments are doing any work. The 
recitation of universal standards provides no normative force to the argument if 
analysis under those standards amounts to a reading of popular preferences. 
And universal arguments are rendered superfluous if opinions suggest that a 
non-universal line of reasoning alone would have been sufficient to reach the 
same conclusion. 
The Court’s jurisprudence as a whole is troubling if one accepts the 
premise expressed by many members of the Court that the judiciary must 
retain access to lines of reasoning about the meaning of rights that do not 
reduce to a reading of mass preferences. One major approach on the Court 
denounces judicial reliance on universal arguments altogether while another 
defends their use but frequently combines them with particular arguments in 
ways that undermine their independent normative force. Opinions that gesture 
towards universal arguments without adequately following through undermine 
them in an insidious way. The exclusively particular approach has the virtue of 
clarity in seeking to eliminate universal arguments, thus openly engaging 
discussion on their appropriateness. Hollow incantation of universal arguments 
threatens to undermine them as a vital component of judicial reasoning without 
acknowledgment. Thus, universal arguments are undermined not only by 
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outright opposition but also by the tentative and unclear manner in which they 
are used. 
Ambiguity regarding the basis of decision is troubling for a reason that 
applies regardless of one’s views on the appropriateness of universal 
arguments. Not only is the character of constitutional discourse at stake, but 
also the people’s ability to shape that discourse. Whatever one thinks about its 
appropriateness, the Justices have in fact appealed to universal standards in 
numerous issue areas. The content of judicial opinions is significant not only 
because it outlines the reasoning supporting the decision at hand, but also 
because it facilitates engagement with that reasoning by other participants in 
the legal system.This is especially important in a system that relies so heavily 
on the participation of actors other than judges. While the judiciary as an 
institution is not designed to be democratic in the same way as a legislature, it 
does depend for its legitimacy on the ability of combatants in an adversarial 
legal system to fully engage with judges over the justifications behind 
decisions. The development of law through adjudication requires an iterative 
discourse involving the input of parties and their counsel. The crafting of 
arguments by advocates is informed by the kinds of reasoning that judges have 
relied upon in previous cases. Universal reasoning, like all kinds of legal 
reasoning, is developed best through an ongoing discourse that probes 
weaknesses in positions and tests implications of principles. Participants 
should be able to contribute to the debate either by further elaborating details 
within the framework or by more precisely specifying the links in the chain of 
reasoning with which they disagree. The development of a coherent body of 
justificatory arguments, shaped significantly by parties other than judges, is 
hampered if the Justices’ reasoning is not sufficiently clear to invite intellectual 
engagement by other players. Ironically, concerns over the appearance of 
illegitimacy may dissuade Justices from developing their universal arguments 
with greater clarity, but the absence of clarity is the greater threat to 
legitimacy. The confusion produced by the Justices’ failure to specify the 
relationship between universal and non-universal bases of interpretation is 
damaging for a system that depends on litigants’ participation in the process 
through which constitutional rights are developed. 
 
